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Recent empirical and theoretical works1 point to institutions protecting property
rights (and among of these of Intellectual Property Rights, IPRs) as essentials
for long-run economic growth. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2005),
Barro (2000), Hall and Jones (1999), Knack and Keefer (1997), Aghion and
Howitt (2005) and Olsson (2007) are only some among the authors who claim
property rights enforcement to be crucial for a country￿ s economic performance.
On a similar line of reasoning goes the recent endogenous growth model by
Eicher and Garcia-Peæalosa (2008) studying the positive e⁄ect of endogenous
IPRs.
Another recent strand of literature, on the other hand, argue how certain in-
stitutions which foster economic growth in developed countries may actually hin-
der the growth of least-developed ones. Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006),
Aghion et al. (2001) or Aghion and Howitt (2005) develop the idea of Ger-
schenkron (1962) that countries lagging behind the technological frontier, and
that perform technology imitation, may be better o⁄ by some non-competitive
policies in the early stages of their development2.
Evidently, countries at di⁄erent development stages are also endowed with
di⁄erent economic fundamentals. Hence, a country￿ s technological progress may
take the form of either innovation or that of imitation and adoption of technolo-
gies discovered elsewhere depending on its particular human capital level, skills
or institutional quality.
At early stages of development, countries usually take advantage of their
backwardness by imitating technologies discovered at the frontier. The process
of technology adoption is not immediate however and it crucially depends on
the recipient country￿ s ability to implement and adopt/adapt these new tech-
nologies.
Previous studies such as those by Keefer and Knack (1997), Behnabib and
Spiegel (1994, 2005) or Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) argue how
both institutional factors and human capital accumulation play a fundamental
role in the technology catching up process. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997),
instead, emphasize how the convergence of backward economies towards higher
1An exception is the work of Boldrin and Levine (2005).
2This literature focused especially on the positive role of anticompetitive product market
regulations and on that of ￿nancial constraints on the economic growth of countries which
perform imitation in order to catch-up with the frontier. This said, however, empirical evidence
on these regards seems to be still mixed and not conclusive. See for example the works of
Gust and Marquez (2004), Conway et al. (2006), Nicoletti et al. (2003) which, di⁄erently
from Acemoglu et al. (2006) or Aghion et al. (2005, 2000) empirically point to the scenario
where pro-competitive regulations amplify the speed of technology catch-up. In the former
papers it is shown how technology adoption may be up to 25% less in countries adopting the
same product market regulation as in the most restrictive OECD country.
1income and to the leader￿ s technological level is basically driven by the relatively
low-cost imitations performed by follower countries.
Crucially, despite the increasing consensus on the positive long-run e⁄ect of
property rights enforcement, dissensus arises when the analysis focuses on the
short and medium run e⁄ect of a tightening of IPRs over countries which di⁄er
in their economic fundamentals (especially human capital levels), development
stages and type of technological activities (imitation vs innovation).
With this paper we try to give some insights on these issues. We analyze
the growth dynamics of two regions (North and South) which di⁄er in their
development stage, composition of human capital stocks, institutional quality
and relative costs of innovation and imitation. We do so by merging some of
the relevant features of the model by Helpman (1993) with those of the growth
model by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) and with the analysis of the impact
of di⁄erences in human capital composition in the fashion of Vandenbussche,
Aghion and Meghir (2006).
Since the seminal study of Helpman (1993) the analysis of the impact of
IPRs on the growth and welfare of leaders and followers, resp. the technological
innovators and the imitators, has provided ambiguous policy making insights.
The reason is intuitive. As pointed out by Maskus (2000) IPRs may, on one
hand, encourage new business development by stimulating technology innova-
tion and compensating innovators for incurring in the ￿xed costs of R&D. On the
other hand, however, tight IPRs enforcement may harm development prospects
of follower countries by signi￿cantly raising the costs of imitation along with
permitting monopolistic behaviors by owners of IPRs with consequent market
distortions in all regions3.
Ceteris paribus within the same economy, the enforcement of IPRs implies
a trade-o⁄ between the positive incentive given to the R&D sector and the neg-
ative e⁄ect coming from an increase in the cost of imitation. Previous empirical
investigation has already pointed out the costliness of imitation. Levin et al.
(1987) and Gallini (1992), for instance, argue how "patents raise imitation costs
by about forty percentage points for both major and typical new drugs, by about
thirty percentage points for major new chemical products, and by twenty-￿ve
percentage points for typical chemical products". Also, Helpman (1993) and Lai
(1998), among others, link negatively the speed of imitation to the extent by
which IPRs are enforced in the follower country.
As pointed out by Connolly and Valderrama (2005) a similar trade-o⁄ ex-
ists, on a cross-country basis, between developed countries (the innovators) and
developing ones (the imitators). Developed countries, those where virtually all
3Recently, moreover, Grossman and Lai (2004) analyze a North-South environment where
both regions owns an innovative sector. Among the others, their results show how, enforcing
IPRs in the South increases the gain for the North at the expenses of the South.
2the innovation is performed, have pushed strongly for international enforcement
of IPRs while many of the developing countries have been opposing this scenario
by arguing how too tight IPRs may end up slowing down economic growth and
harming their development by reducing drastically the access to new technolo-
gies.
Interestingly, our results do not fully support neither the "Northern view"
that LDCs￿IPRs should be strengthened up to the levels of the North nor the
"Southern view" that IPRs should be lax in order not to harm the growth
prospect of technological follower countries. Our results lie in between these
two views which, we show, are not mutually exclusive. Hence, the results of our
model depart from previous theoretical literature by endogeneizing the optimal
IPRs regime of the South as a simultaneous function of the costliness of imitation
(itself linked to the human capital composition of each economy) and of the
actual development stage and institutional quality of the followers.
In our model, the South (the follower region) is endowed with weak institu-
tions, a relatively high fraction of unskilled workers (over the skilled ones) and
it will initially perform imitation of the technologies discovered in the North.
We will be assuming, moreover, that di⁄erences in the composition of human
capital stocks shape the relative easiness by which both innovation and imi-
tation are performed within an economy. In particular we will assume that
countries endowed with a low skilled workforce will perform innovation at rel-
atively higher costs w.r.t. the correspondent costs of performing imitation and
viceversa. Crucially moreover, the ease of imitation will be assumed, similarly
to Helpman (1993), to be a negative function of the extent by which IPRs are
enforced as well as a negative function of the proximity to the technological
frontier as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
Given these assumptions we ￿nd an optimal IPRs regime for the follower
country. This optimal regime is endogenous in the sense that is a function of
the follower development stage, of its endowment of human capital, of its insti-
tutional quality and of its proximity to the technological frontier. We show how
the optimal IPRs regime maximizes the growth of the follower while minimizing
the technology gap with the frontier in the long-run.
Hence, on one hand, we show how, given the economic fundamentals of the
follower and its capabilities of producing own-based R&D, an enforcement of
IPRs above the optimal regime will decrease the growth in the follower country
by excessively increasing the costs of copying a technology and therefore shifting
resources from the more pro￿table imitative sector to the relatively high-cost
innovation-R&D sector. The same happens if the South starts performing in-
novation rather than imitation at low development stage.
On the other hand, due to the fact that the adoption of new technologies is
itself a costly activity, too weak IPRs will not give enough incentive to the imi-
tators by decreasing the revenues coming from imitation. This might eventually
3lead to an equilibrium where the imitative e⁄ort will be suboptimal and actual
growth less than the potential one with, instead, moderate IPRs protection.
Finally, we show that, once a "threshold development stage" is reached,
the follower may optimally switch to innovation by fully enforcing IPRs and
achieving a higher proximity with the technology frontier in the long-run. This
result is in line with the theoretical model by Eicher and Garcia-Peæalosa (2001)
or with the empirical results by Falvey et al. (2002) or Ginarte and Park (1997)
who detect threshold levels in the enforcement of IPRs.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we will give the ba-
sic setup of the model focusing on the main variables which will be analyzed
throughout the paper. In section 3 we will depict the behavior of the North
economy (the leader) and set the conditions by which innovation is performed
at the frontier. In section 4, instead, we will describe the South economy (the
follower) and the setup for imitation by focusing particularly on the costliness
of imitation and adoption of technologies discovered at the frontier and on the
impact of IPRs protection, human capital composition and di⁄erences in in-
stitutional quality. Section 5 will be devoted to the study of the steady state
growth and to the analysis of the transitional dynamics which lead the follower
to theoretically converge towards the leader. Section 6, instead, shows our main
theoretical results by analyzing the reaction of the follower economy to changes
in the main variables of the model such as IPRs enforcement or the human
capital composition of the southern workforce. At the end some conclusions.
2 Setup of the model
We assume, in the fashion of Grossman and Helpman (1981) or Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1997), that the world consists of 2 countries denoted by i=1,2 where
country 1 represents the North and country 2 the South. The output in the two
countries is expressed by means of a Spence (1976)/Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)





where 0 < ￿ < 1, Yi is output and Xji is the quantity of the jth nondurable
intermediate good used in the production by country i. Ni is the number of
types of intermediates available (known) in country i.
As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) we use the variable Ni to proxy for
the technological level of country i. The technology shown in eq. (1) can be
accessed by all agents in country i and production occurs under competitive
conditions.
4Ai represents institutional quality while Zi captures speci￿cally the enforce-
ment of IPRs in country i. Lyi is instead the fraction of the labor force employed
in the production of output Yi . Trade is assumed to be balanced between the
two countries such that the domestic output is equal to the total of domestic ex-
penditures which go for consumption of goods, Ci, production of intermediates,
Xji, and R&D aimed at discovering new blueprints and varieties of intermedi-
ates.
2.1 Human capital composition
We assume labor in the 2 countries to be heterogeneous in human capital stocks.
In both countries a fraction of population will be of the low skill type, namely
Lyi, and employed in the production of the ￿nal good Yi .
The remaining fraction of the workforce, namely Lri, represents the high
skilled workers who will be employed in the innovation or imitation activities of
country 1 and 24. The following general condition is hence satis￿ed:
Li = Lyi + Lri (2)
where Li is the total workforce and Lyi and Lri represent respectively the
low and high skilled shares of total workforce for country i.
Noticeably, North and South di⁄er in the composition (and not only in the
average levels) of their human capital stocks. The North, consistently with em-
pirical evidence, is populated by a relatively larger share of high skilled workers
(over its total population) than the South5. Conversely, the South, is largely
populated by low skilled workers and only a relatively small fraction of its total
workforce is high skill.
This condition can be restated more formally as follows:
Lr1 > Lr2 (3)
and, conversely
Ly1 < Ly2 (4)
4In practice, for country 2, we will see that Lr2 is employed in the imitation sector in the
adoption/adaptation of the imitated blueprints.
5The share of the workforce achieving tertiary or secondary educational attainment levels
is evidently higher in developed countries than in LDCs. This empirical observation motivates
the theoretical assumption of our model.
52.2 Institutional Quality and IPRs enforcement
The variable Ai proxies for the level of institutional quality of country i. Some
authors such as Keefer and Knack (2002), Alesina et al. (1992) or Levine and
Renelt (1991) point to the process of democratization and to the political stabil-
ity of a country as the main features of a country￿ s institutional quality. Others,
such as Mauro (1995), or Barro (2000) also emphasize the role of corruption and
criminality as distortions to the correct functioning of a country￿ s institutional
framework. We follow Hall and Jones (1999) and assume that the North owns
more developed institutions than the South as follows6:
A1 > A2 (5)
Importantly, the parameter Ai proxies for all government and policy arrange-
ments but it abstracts from IPRs protection which, due to the aim of our study,
we explicitly insert into the model through the variable Zi.
Higher values assigned to Zi imply tighter IPRs protection accorded to. both
(i) goods and patents produced domestically, (ii) goods and patents produced
externally from possible imitation by ￿rms operating in country i. More pre-
cisely we assume full IPRs protection in country 1, the North. This corresponds
to saying that Z1 = max7. More generally a high value of Z1 implies a strong
protection, within the boundaries of country 1 only, of the property rights of
domestic ￿rms which discover a new blueprint (in country 1) but also of the in-
tellectual property rights belonging to foreign ￿rms (those creating knowledge in
country 2) against imitation by all agents operating in country 1. For simplicity,
then, we assume that no imitation is possible in country 1 whatsoever.
On the other hand, a high value of Z1 does not ensure ￿rms based in country
1 against the possible imitation of their blueprints by agents in country 2 where
the IPRs protection may be weaker. More formally we assume that protection
of IPRs in country 2 is imperfect such that 0 < Z2 < Z1: The imperfection
of the IPRs system in the South makes it possible for agents in country 2 to
imitate the blueprints discovered abroad, in country 1. As in Helpman (1993),
the degree by which IPRs are enforced in the South ends up a⁄ecting the rate
of imitation along with the number of imitated goods in country 2.8 Imitation
is then likely to occur in country 2 and it will be a negative function of the
strength of the IPRs regime in the South.
6The intuition is that countries with better institutional quality are also those which ceteris
paribus experience higher levels of GDP per capita. Robust empirical evidence justi￿es this
assumption.
7The bottom line is that, developed countries (representing the North in our model) usually
grant the maximum protection to IPRs while, conversely, protection in developing countries
(the South) is usually imperfect and relatively low.
8In Helpman (1993) an increase of IPRs protection in the South negatively a⁄ects the rate
of imitation in the South. In our formalization, as we will show in the next sections, we
directly link the extent by which IPRs are enforced to the costs of imitation activities. Still,
we obtain the same result that an increase in IPRs enforcement leads to a decrease of the rate
of imitation and of the number of imitated goods.
62.3 Development stage and technological leadership
As it is usual in this kind of models we assume the North to be the technological
leader. This is implied by the following:
N1(0) > N2(0) (6)
where the pool of blueprints (or intermediates) that are known in country 1
is strictly higher than that in the technological follower country 29. The relative






Throughout all the paper we will be using the measure in eq.(7) to de￿ne
the relative development stage of country 2 w.r.t. the leader.
3 The leader country
The basic setting we use in order to model innovation combines various fea-
tures of the formalizations of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Romer (1990)
and Helpman (1993). In principle, economic agents can increase their technol-
ogy stock (the pool of available intermediates known for production, Ni) either
by inventing a new blueprint or by imitating/adopting an existing one which is
known in the other country. In practice, however, we will be assuming that the
North is initially the only innovator and that the South imitates the discoveries
made at the technological frontier. Later we will allow for this initial situation
to change depending on the development stage of the follower.
3.1 Cost of innovation
One of the crucial assumptions of our formalization is that both innovation and
imitation/adaptation are costly activities10. We de￿ne the cost of innovation
by the parameter ￿i.
Instead of assuming a ￿xed cost for innovation as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1997) we assume, somehow more realistically, that the cost of inventing a
new blueprint is a decreasing function of the fraction of population endowed
with high skills within each economy. This is like saying that the relative eas-
iness of producing a unit of innovation increases with the fraction of highly
talented/educated researchers which are employed in the R&D sector. It can be
9This is to say that there are no intermediates known in 2 that are unknown in 1 such that
country 1 never has the reason to imitate country 2.
10This assumption is not new in the literature both empirical and theoretical. See for ex-
ample Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002), Behnabib and Spiegel
(2002), Mans￿eld, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) and many others.
7noticed that in our formalization the human capital "composition" e⁄ect enters
directly into the model shaping the relative costs of innovation (and of imita-
tion). More formally we assume the following cost function for innovation11:
￿i =  (Lri)￿1 (8)
where, as pointed out before, ￿i represents the cost of inventing a new blue-
print and Lri is instead the share of high skilled workers employed in the R&D
sector producing new knowledge.12
Notice that combination of eq. (8) with eq. (3) imply the following:
￿2 ￿ ￿1 (9)
The cost of producing a unit of innovation in country 1 is lower than the
corresponding cost in country 2 due to the higher share of high skilled work-
ers employed in the North w.r.t. those employed in the South. The di⁄erent
composition of human capital stocks in the two countries shapes their relative
innovation possibilities. The country endowed with the higher fraction of high
skilled labor ends up being relatively more e¢ cient in producing innovation due
to the more educated and talented researchers employed in R&D. For simplicity
of exposition we assume that the shares of high and low skilled workers in the
two economies remain constant such that eq. (9) holds over time13.
3.2 Innovation production in the leader country
Let us now assume a new intermediate good is introduced (invented) in country
1. The innovator retains monopoly power over the use of this good for produc-
tion within country 114. Since the intermediate good j is priced in country 1 at
P1j the ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿t to the inventor is given by:
￿1j = (P1j ￿ 1)X1j (10)
where the 1 inside the brackets represents the marginal cost of producing
the intermediate Xij. The marginal product of the jth intermediate is instead
given by:
11Our assumption is similar to that of Aghion and Howitt (2005), Behnabib and Spiegel
(2005) who implicitly imply how the share of high skill workforce, and not the average quality
of human capital, is a crucial determinant of the amount of innovation that an economy may
produce.
12We assume here, for simplicity, that   is a linear function. This may not be the case
however and more complexity may be added to the model by assuming a non linear relation
between the cost of innovation and the share of skilled workers employed in R&D. The results
will not change qualitatively.
13Results would be the same if we allowed human capital composition to slowly change over
time as in reality may happen. Mathematical tractability would be, however, more demanding
not adding much to the results.
14As pointed out by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), it is however simple to allow the good




This, in turns, leads to the demand function for the intermediate j from all
producers of goods in country 1:
X1j = Ly1(A1Z1￿=P1j)1=1￿￿ (12)
Substituting eq.(12) into eq.(10) we get the monopoly price, which is the
same for all types of intermediates:
P1j = P1 = 1=￿ > 1 (13)
which in turns implies that the total quantity of the jth intermediate that
country i will be producing amounts to the following:
X1j = X1 = Ly1(A1Z1)1=(1￿￿)￿2=(1￿￿) (14)
From this we ￿nally get country￿ s 1 total output by substituting eq.(14) into
eq.(1) which gives:
Y1 = (A1Z1)1=(1￿￿)￿2=(1￿￿)Ly1N1 (15)
Two basic results can be directly seen from examination of eq. (15). On
one hand, total output is a positive function of the country speci￿c institutional
quality and of the enforcement of property rights consistently with the recent
empirical evidence (e.g. Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001) etc.).
On the other hand, holding constant country speci￿c institutional quality,
output per capita is going to increase as the technology level Ni, the number of
intermediates available for production, increases15.
By susbstituting eq.(13) and eq.(14) into eq.(10) one can get the ￿ ow of
monopoly pro￿t from sales to the owner of the rights of intermediate j as follows:
￿1j = ￿1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ly1(Z1A1)1=(1￿￿)￿(1+￿)=(1￿￿) (16)
As argued by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) the present value of pro￿ts for
the jth innovator is simply ￿1j=r1 where r1 is the rate of return in country 1.
When free entry is assumed in the R&D sector (and the quantity of R&D is
nonzero) it must be that the present value of pro￿ts must equal the constant cost
of invention ￿1 at each point in time. Hence, rearrangement of the free-entry
condition implies the following rate of return for economy 1:
15It is di¢ cult to see from eq. (15) the partial e⁄ect of an increase of respectively the skilled
or of the unskilled fraction of workforce on total output since N is a function of human capital
composition. We will show in the next sections how it is the increase of the high skill share of
the workforce to be growth enhancing while an increase in the fraction of population endowed






(Z1A1)1=(1￿￿)￿2=(1￿￿) = ￿1=￿1 (17)
where the rate of return r1 is the ratio of ￿1, the ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿t
given in eq.(16), to the cost ￿1 of obtaining this pro￿t ￿ ow.
We assume that consumers maximize utility over in￿nite horizons through





(C1￿￿ ￿ 1)=(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
dt (18)
where, as usual ￿ > 0 represents the rate of time preference and ￿ > 0
the magnitude of the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption16. If we
maximize the utility function subject to a standard budget constraint we obtain
the usual expression for the consumption growth rate:
￿
C1=C1 = (1=￿)(r1 ￿ ￿) (19)
The growth rate of C1 is constant due to the constancy of r1 as in eq.(17).
Hence, the growth rate of the economy in equilibrium is given by:







where the parameters of the model are such that ￿1=￿1 ￿ ￿ ensures positive
growth.
4 The follower country
4.1 The cost of imitation
Imitation and adaptation of leading-edge technologies imply a cost for the fol-
lower. The costliness of imitation is widely observed and acknowledged in the-
oretical and empirical literature. Maskus, Saggi and Puttitanun (2004), Mans-
￿eld, Schwartz and Wagner (1981), Coe and Helpman (1995) or Behnabib and
Spiegel (2005) point out how the cost of both the adaptation and imitation
of technologies discovered at the frontier (or in other technological sectors) is
usually positive but relatively lower than the cost of innovation.
As argued by Maskus (2000), imitation usually takes the form of adapta-
tions of existing technologies to new markets. Mans￿eld, Schwartz and Wagner
(1981) point out for instance how, over 48 di⁄erent products in chemical, drug,
electronics and machinery U.S. industries, the costs of imitation lied between
16This implies the intertemporal elasticity of subsitution being equal to 1=￿:
1040% and 90% of the costs of innovation. On the same line the empirical results
of Teece (2008) who estimated the cost of technology transfer across countries
to be equal, on average, to 19% of total project expenditure. Nelson and Phelps
(1966) argue, moreover, how imitation and adoption imply an investment in
human capital while Abramovitz (1986) emphasizes the role played by social
and institutional resources in order for follower countries to adopt technologies
discovered at the frontier.
We build on previous theoretical literature by expressing the cost function







where ￿2, the cost of imitation in country 2, is assumed to be a function of
the strength of IPRs enforcement Z2, and of N2=N1 the proximity to the frontier
(the development stage of the follower).
Di⁄erent aspects are here worth noticing. First of all, in the fashion of
Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) we assume
the cost of imitation to be an increasing function of the proximity of the imitator
to the technological frontier. The rationale goes as follows. When there exists
a large pool of innovations (blueprints) from which an imitator can copy, the
cost of imitation tends to be low. This happens when the ratio N2=N1 is small
and the follower is relatively far from the frontier. However, when the pool
of blueprints available for imitation shrinks, due to a higher proximity of the
follower country w.r.t. the leader, the costs of imitation rise due to the fact that
the remaining blueprints may be those more di¢ cult to be imitated (or to be
adjusted to production processes in country 2). This happens when the ratio
N2=N1 gets closer to 1.
Hence, similarly to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) when the blueprints avail-
able for imitation in the follower country are exhausted, the cost of imitation
equals the cost of innovation, ￿2, since imitation cannot be performed anymore.
The parameter ￿ represents the elasticity of the cost of imitation to a de-
crease in the pool of available intermediates. It has been argued by Behnabib
and Spiegel (2005) or Basu and Weil (1998), for instance, how the adoption of
distant technologies may be more di¢ cult for the follower. In particular, it is
sometimes assumed how the technological frontier may not be immediately "ap-
propriate" for the follower to be imitated due to the large technical di⁄erences
between the leader and the recipient country. In our particular case, if ￿ > 1
an increase in the technological distance between the North and the South will
imply a more than proportional increase in the cost of imitation re￿ ecting the
increasing di¢ culty faced by the follower in imitating distant technologies. The
opposite applies when we assume ￿ < 1 while when ￿ = 1 an increase in the
11development gap N2=N1 will be ceteris paribus proportional to the increase in
the imitation cost.
It is not only the relative proximity of the follower to the technological
frontier to be important in de￿ning the cost function for imitation. We depart
from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) formalization, by assuming the cost of
imitation to be decreasing in the share of high skilled workforce employed in
imitation activities in the economy, that is Lr2.
More formally combining eq. (21) with eq. (8) we can restate the cost
function for imitation as follows:






As argued by Nelson and Phelps (1966), the speed of technology catch-up is a
positive and increasing function of human capital levels. The higher the human
capital of a lagging economy and the faster will be the technological catch-up.
In fact, Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue how "it is clear that the farmer with
a relatively high level of education has tended to adopt productive innovations
earlier than the farmer with relatively little education [...] for he is better able
to discriminate between promising and unpromising ideas [...] The less educated
farmer, for whom the information in technical journals means less, is prudent
to delay the introduction of a new technique until he has concrete evidence of
its pro￿tability".17
We insert into this same line of reasoning by arguing how reverse engineering,
on which a considerable part of the imitation activities is based, is more likely
to be performed by engineers than by low skilled workers. Instead, it is the
physical production of the "replicas", used for production of the ￿nal good, to
be carried out by unskilled workers. Following this rationale, our formalization
implies that the cost of imitation will be lower the higher the share of skilled
workforce in the South.
Finally, consistently with previous theoretical literature, we assume the cost
of imitation to be increasing in the enforcement of IPRs within the follower￿ s
boundaries, that is, to be an increasing function of Z2. From a general point of
view intellectual property rights are legal mechanisms designed to represent a
barrier to the possibility of free riding and imitation of new ideas, blueprints or
technologies by agents which did not incurred in the costs of producing these in-
novations. Maskus (2000) argues how "absent such rights, economically valuable
17Our assumption is somehow alternative to the one of Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir
(2004) in which a low skilled worforce is assumed to be better suited for imitation tasks than
a more skilled one. In Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2004) an increase of the share of
unskilled workforce (when the South performs imitation) results to be growth enhancing since
the elasticity of unskilled labor is higher in imitation than in innovation. We believe, instead,
that imitation requires a consistent amount of skills at any development stage.
12information could be appropriated by competitive rivals". It is straightforward
to understand, therefore, how IPRs are aimed at ensuring the innovator with an
adequate monetary compensation for the investment in R&D. At the same time
IPRs work on the imitators￿side by prohibiting free imitation and, therefore,
rising the relative costs of copying a new blueprint.
Helpman (1993), among the others, argues how "we may interpret a tight-
ening of intellectual property rights as a decline in the rate of imitation; the
stronger legal and administrative actions taken by the Southern government to
protect Northern IPRs, the slower the pace of imitation". In our formalization,
hence, IPRs enter the cost function of imitation by increasing the cost of adopt-
ing and copying leader￿ s technologies and therefore reducing the speed and pace
of the imitation performed by the follower.18
To summarize, the way we formalize the cost function of imitation merges at
least three basic assumptions recently independently seen in theoretical models.
As in Aghion and Howitt (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2006) or Basu and Weil,
we link the cost of imitation on the actual development stage of the follower
(N2=N1). Also, as in Behnabib and Spiegel (1994, 2005) and Nelson and Phelps
(1966) the cost of imitation will decrease as the skills of the workforce (educa-
tion) increase. Finally, an increase in the IPRs enforcement of the South, as in
Helpman (1993) or Maskus (2000) will imply a reduction in the possibilities of
imitation and a rise in its cost. All these features, when analyzed jointly, will
determine the optimal growth path for the follower economy.
4.2 Imitation in the follower economy
Now that we have set the conditions for the cost function of imitation we can
move to the dynamic behavior of the South economy. We assume that country
2 starts in a situation where the cost of innovation is strictly higher than the
cost of imitation such that:
￿2 > ￿2(0) (23)
Once a blueprint is discovered in the North this will be imitated by an agent
in the South. Similarly to what happens in the North, the imitator in the South
will retain monopoly power over the use of the imitated good for production
within country 2. The intuition, again, goes as follows. Imitation/adaptation of
a new technology is a costly activity; the outcome of imitation results in a new
intermediate good, X2j, which will be similar to the initial one X1j discovered
in the leader country but "ready-to-use" for production in country 2.19
18One may think of an increase of IPRs enforcement as corresponding to a decrease of the
pool of available blueprints for imitation. This, consistently to what we argued up to now
would ultimately increase the cost of imitation.
19We may think of the imitated good as one of lower quality but that still own the basic
characteristics of the leader￿ s innovation. Many example may be reported for this situation.
Counter￿ted CDs, MP3 players, clothings and so on. All these goods are similar to the original
13The computation of the rate of return in country 2 is slightly more complex
than that for country 1. This is because the cost of imitation is increasing
over time being a positive function of the ratio N2=N1. We follow the simpler
formalization proposed by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)20 by assuming that
the follower country is far from the technological frontier and that the pool of
available innovations to be imitated is large so that the rate of return will be







Interestingly, a gap in rate of returns arises between the North and the South
since the cost of imitation in the South is initially lower if compared to the cost
of innovation in the North. This gap is such that r2 > r1 during the transitional
dynamics21.
Also we are able to compute the growth rate for the whole economy in
country 2 as a function of model parameters:







5 Steady state and growth dynamics
In order to be more speci￿c about the dynamic behavior of the economies it
is convenient to start with the analysis of the growth in steady state and then
move to the analysis of the transitional dynamics.
5.1 Steady state
In steady state the two economies are expected to grow at the rate of expansion
of the technology frontier, that is at ￿1. By de￿nition, therefore, in steady state
N2 grows at the same rate as N1 so that ￿2 remains constant in accordance with
eq. (21). Also, C1 grows at the same rate as C2 which corresponds to ￿1 in the
long run.
ones in the sense that own their basic characteristics and features but, at the same time, are
usually of lower quality and sold at a cheaper price.
20A slightly more complex formalization is given in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) where
the rate of return for country 2 is expressed by r2 = ￿2=￿2 +
￿
￿2=￿2where r2 includes the
capital gain term
￿
￿2=￿2 which adds to the dividend rate ￿2=￿2: We refer the interested reader
to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), p.8.
21For now it is convenient to notice simply that under the general assumptions given from
eq.(3) to eq. (8), for N2=N1 < (N2=N1)￿ < 1 it will always hold that r2 > r1. The asterisk
superscript represents the technology proximity of the follower w.r.t. leader in steady state.
We will discuss this situation in the next section.
14As in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), even if the two countries do not share
a common capital market, the process of technology di⁄usion will end up equal-
izing the rate of returns in the two economies. The steady state value of the
rate of return expressed in eq. (24) for economy 2 will be equal to that of the
leader economy 1 as follows:
r￿
2 = r1 = ￿1=￿1 (26)
where the asterisk superscript denotes values in steady state for country 2.
Hence, since r￿
2 = r1, eq. (17) and eq.(24) imply:
￿2=￿￿
2 = ￿1=￿1 (27)
where ￿￿
2 represents the correspondent steady state value for the cost of
imitation ￿2. Combining eq.(16) with eq.(??) we can express the steady state
value for the cost of imitation as a function of the other variables of the model.
This is as follows:
￿￿
2 = ￿1(Z2A2=Z1A1)1=(1￿￿)(Ly2=Ly1) (28)
5.2 Transitional dynamics
From what argued up to now it is easy to understand that for any given value
of ￿2(t) < ￿￿
2 the follower economy will be found below its steady state. Hence,
during the transitional path, the South will be growing faster than the North
due to the relative gap in rate of returns between the imitation performed by
the South (which is highly pro￿table at initial stages of development) and the
innovation performed by the North.
One may think of this situation as the South having a cost "comparative
advantage" w.r.t. the leader which makes it able to grow relatively faster.
Nonetheless, ceteris paribus, as country 2 converges towards the technological
level of the leader (N2=N1 gets bigger) the cost of imitation in country 2 rises
up to a point where country 2 completely exhausts its "growth comparative
advantage" and starts growing at the rate of the technological frontier. That
is, ￿2 goes from being initially higher than ￿1 to a situation where ￿￿
2 = ￿1 in
steady state22.More formally we have the following:
￿2(t) = ￿￿
2 () ￿￿
2 = ￿1 (29)
while, during the transition dynamics it will be that
￿2(t) < ￿￿
2 () ￿2 > ￿1 (30)
22This also implies a technology gap between country 1 and country 2 equal to (N2=N1)￿.
156 Appropriate IPRs, H and Development Stage
Di⁄erent IPRs regimes are likely to a⁄ect the growth dynamics and especially
the optimal decision of imitation in the South. On the other hand, the relative
composition of human capital (skilled over unskilled workers) and the level of
institutional quality enter the cost function of imitation and innovation and
therefore they also de￿ne under what conditions imitation may (or may not) be
optimal in the long run.
Up to now we have been analyzing the situation for which the South grows
faster than the North by pro￿tably imitating the technologies discovered in the
leader country. Two general assumptions are at the basis of this result.
First, we assumed that the cost of imitation in the South, ￿2(0), is lower than
the cost of innovation in the North, ￿1, (condition for which the South tends
to converge to the North). Second, we assumed that in the South imitation is
initially cheaper than innovation, that is, the cost of imitation ￿2(0) is lower
than the correspondent cost of innovation ￿2 (condition for which imitation is
performed rather than innovation)23. The choice of the South of performing
imitation during the transitional dynamics (rather than innovation) is therefore
based on the gap between ￿2(t) and ￿2. More formally we have been assuming
the following:
￿2(t) < ￿1 < ￿2 (31)
We are now interested in de￿ning under what general conditions imitation,
rather than innovation, results to be an optimal activity for the follower in
the long run. This reduces to ￿nding for what parameter values the cost of
imitation, in the long run, is lower than the cost of innovation, that is when
￿￿
2 < ￿2 is satis￿ed:We give the results in Proposition 1 here below:
Proposition 1 As long as di⁄erences in IPRs enforcement between leader and
follower are large, the follower country ￿nds optimal to imitate in the long run.
Putting together eq.(31) with eq.(28) we can restate the condition for which
imitation is optimal (w.r.t. innovation) in the long run as follows:
￿￿
2 < ￿2 , (Z2A2=Z1A1)1=(1￿￿)Ly2=Ly1 < ￿2=￿1 (32)
Rearranging eq. (32) yields to the following, more general, optimal condition
for imitation in the long run expressed as a function of the IPRs ratio Z2=Z1:
￿ < (￿=￿)1￿￿￿
￿1 (33)
23Recall, also, that ￿2 > ￿1 strictly holds, that is, the cost of innovation in country 2 is
strictly higher than the cost of innovation in country 1 due to the relative di⁄erence in human
capital stocks composition across countries.
16where we rede￿ned the variables as follows24:
￿ = Z2=Z1 (34)
￿ = ￿2=￿1 (35)
￿ = (Ly2=Ly1) (36)
￿ = A2=A1 (37)
The intuition behind this result goes as follows. For large enough di⁄erences
in IPRs enforcement between the North and the South (small values of ￿) the
steady state cost of imitation in the South will be always lower than the cor-
respondent cost of innovation in the South, that is ￿￿
2 < ￿2 will be satis￿ed.
This is to say that, when IPRs are weakly enforced in the South, imitation will
result to be an easier and more pro￿table activity for the follower if compared
to innovation.
Formally, as long as the inequality in eq.(33) holds, also the steady state
cost of imitation for country 2 ￿￿
2 will be strictly less than the correspondent
cost of innovation ￿2. As argued before, this condition is satis￿ed for relatively
low values of Z2=Z1 such that, in that case, the follower will always choose to
imitate. :
The analysis of IPRs regimes is of particular interest since developing coun-
tries have been pushed to comply with very restrictive IPRs regimes by de-
veloped countries. The rationale for this argument is based on the belief that
strengthening IPRs protection in the South may play the crucial role of incen-
tivizing innovative e⁄ort and R&D and consequently may promote economic
growth.
Developing countries, on the other hand, claim how given their "actual"
development stage, an increase in the IPRs enforcement may end up harming
their development prospects by rising the costs of imitation and inhibiting their
quasi-free access to new technologies.
In Proposition 2 we show how the "Southern" belief that strengthening
IPRs is detrimental for the follower country (when this performs imitation)
does not always hold and that instead some degree of IPRs is optimal in the
South as well. Instead in Proposition 3 we show that the "Northern" belief that
innovation should be preferred to imitation "no matter what" does not hold for
a broad set of scenarios where the development stage, the human capital level or
24Notice that the new variables in eq.(33) are all expressed as the ratio of the follower￿ s
quantities over the leader￿ s in order to make the analysis more readable.
17institutional quality of the follower are too distant from that of the technological
frontier.
Proposition 2 For large enough di⁄erences in economic fundamentals between
leader and follower a moderate increase of IPRs enforcement is bene￿cial for the
follower country even if this preforms only imitation. Higher proximity to
the technological frontier is achieved by the follower when IPRs are moderately
strengthened.
From a ￿rst examination of eq.(33) it is possible to notice how a moderate
increase of Z2 (that is, a relative strengthening of IPRs in the South) will not
result to be harmful to the growth of the follower even in a situation where this
country only performs imitation. In fact, it is easy to see how there exists a set
of parameter values for which the IPRs regime of the South Z2 could increase
without violating the optimality condition for imitation in the long run, ￿￿
2 < ￿2:
Rearranging eq. (33) as Z1A1
A2 (￿=￿)1￿￿ > Z2 ) ￿￿
2 < ￿2 it can be shown that
there exists a wide set of values for A1;A2 and Z2 for which an increase in Z2
will not violate the optimality condition for imitation in the long run.
From an economic point of view, the intuition behind this result goes as
follows and it crucially relies on the observed costliness of imitation. In order to
perform imitation a ￿rm in the South must incur in some non negligible costs.
These costs must be repaid by a pro￿t stream to the imitator as it happens to
the innovator in the leader economy when this discovers a new blueprint.
On one hand, a weak enforcement of IPRs in country 2 allows more free
imitation of the blueprints (intermediates) discovered in country 1 by decreasing
the relative cost of imitation as shown in eq.(21). On the other hand, however,
a weak IPRs regime decreases the ￿ ow of monopoly pro￿ts to the imitator in
country 2 as shown in eqs.(??) and (24) by granting the imitator with a weaker
monopoly power and reducing his/her possibilities to fully recoup the costs of
imitation.25
Crucially, as long as ￿￿
2 < ￿2 applies, that is as long as the steady state cost
of imitation is lower than the cost of innovation in the South, an increase of
IPRs results to be bene￿cial for the growth of the follower in imitation.
The implications of this result can be seen clearer if we derive the expression
for the steady state value of the technology gap (N2=N1)￿ between country 1 and
2. Combining eq.(21) with eq.(28) we derive a unique value for N2=N1 which
satis￿es the steady state condition ￿2(t) = ￿￿
2. This is given by the following:
25A case for our argument is the high competition among the imitators of the original
iPhone by Apple. At least a dozen di⁄erent clones (o¢ cial and uno¢ cial) of the original
mobile device exist in the market (which are accessible from all over the world) and which are








We are interested in the relation between the long run technological prox-
imity of the South w.r.t. the leader, (N2=N1)
￿, and the e⁄ect of an increase in
the strength of the IPRs regime in the South. In particular, we are interested
in studying under what conditions an increase in the enforcement of IPRs leads
to an increase (if any) in the proximity of the follower w.r.t. the technological
frontier.
The assumptions made on the model parameters ensure that the steady state
technology gap "in imitation" is reached before country 2 reaches the technology
level of the leader, that is 0 < (N2=N1)￿ < 1.
It is possible to see how he steady state gap in eq.(38) is a positive function of
Z2 through the parameter ￿26. We show the main implications of propositions
1 and 2 in Figure 1.
Both the cost function of imitation as given in eq.(21) and its correspondent
value in steady state as in eq.(28) increase as Z2 rises. In particular, the function
depicting the current cost of imitation, ￿2(t), becomes steeper at higher values
of Z2 and intercepts the function representing the steady state cost function
at higher values where higher proximity with the technological frontier in the
long-run is increasingly achieved.






= ~ ￿). A tightening of IPRs in the
South leads to increasingly higher values of technology proximity with the fron-
tier in the long run which are achieved by corresponding shifts of the transitional
path ￿2 to the right in our graph. Crucially, once ￿￿
2 = ￿2 the South becomes in-
di⁄erent on whether performing imitation or innovation. Hence, when ￿
000
= ~ ￿
holds we ￿nd a unique value of (N2=N1)￿
￿
000 which represents the maximum
proximity w.r.t. technological frontier attainable in imitation given the speci￿c
economic fundamentals of the South. Hence, ~ ￿ is the optimal IPRs regime given
the institutional given the institutional quality and human capital endowment
of the South.
26Notice that an increase in Lr2 in the denominator implies a more than proportional
increase in the numerator of eq.(38) due to ￿1=(1￿￿) and ￿ < 1:
19Transitional dynamics
Corollary: Given the follower￿ s particular human capital composition, in-
stitutional quality and development stage a threshold IPRs regime is found such
that the follower is indi⁄erent on whether performing imitation or innovation;
~ ￿ = (￿=￿)1￿￿￿
￿1.The optimal IPRs regime depends on the institutional quality
and human capital endowment of the South.
The long run proximity of the South w.r.t. technological frontier does not
only depend on the IPRs regime but it is also an increasing function of the
institutional quality endowment of the follower, through ￿ and of its human
capital composition, through ￿=￿:
20The positive impact of better institutional quality (A2) in the South is
somehow straightforward and it can be seen by examination of eq.(28) and
eq.(38).This result is consistent with previous empirical literature such as Hall
and Jones (1999) or Acemoglu et al. (2001). Better institutions in the South
are associated with higher technology levels in the long run.
The result of proposition 2 is of particular interest due to the way we
inserted IPRs enforcement into the model; that is on the "cost-of-imitation" side.
Previous theoretical literature, such as Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman
(1993) or Lai (1997) points out how an increase in IPRs enforcement leads to
a welfare loss for the South. From our formalization it is evident how these
results are somehow alternative. In fact, when we take into account di⁄erences
in the development stage, human capital levels and institutional quality across
countries, we can show how a moderate increase in IPRs enforcement raises the
welfare of the South and its proximity to the technological frontier.
It is worth noticing, however, how our result applies as long as the inequality
in eq.(33) is satis￿ed. Instead, an excessive protection of IPRs may end up
harming the follower economies when these are at their initial stages of economic
and institutional development. In fact, for values of ￿ > ~ ￿, such IPRs regime
does not imply any welfare improvement while it only reduces the growth rate
of the follower country under imitation. Then, what happens if, instead of
imitating, the follower decides to innovate?
Proposition 3 Switching from imitation to innovation before an appropriate
development stage is achieved (the steady state technology proximity w.r.t. the
frontier) is not an optimal choice for the follower country.
Developed countries (especially the U.S. and Japan) have been pushing least
developed ones to enforce stronger IPRs regimes within their boundaries. Their
argument is that stronger IPRs would foster own based R&D and eventually
economic growth. Clearly, the request of stronger IPRs in the South is also
based on economic calculations by developed countries which are net exporters
of new technologies and that every years are hurt from imitation and patent
infringements in southern countries.
It is often argued how developing countries are poor due to their low tech-
nological level and that, therefore, they should boost their R&D sector. This
result may be achieved, within this line of reasoning, by tightening IPRs and
by giving stronger incentives to innovators in the South.
If indeed one may agree on the empirical evidence that developing countries
are poor because of their low technical and technological level, it is not clear
whether the solution to this problem should be to directly incentivize own based
research and R&D regardless of the development stage of these countries and of
their actual capabilities of producing innovation.
21We show how a shift from imitation to innovation too early in the develop-
ment of the South may not be welfare-improving leading, instead, to a decrease,
rather than an increase, of the follower￿ s growth rate.
Let us de￿ne a scenario such that the South decides to switch from imita-
tion to innovation before its steady state technology gap (N2=N1)￿ is actually
reached. We are here depicting the initial stages of development of the South
when this economy is still far from the technological frontier and it is found
within the transitional dynamics below its steady state. Notice that this hap-
pens under weak conditions such that (N2=N1)￿ may (or may not) be lower than
the optimal ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ and that ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ does not have to hold with equality.
Thus, given these assumptions, when [N2(t)=N1(t)] < (N2=N1)￿ it also ap-
plies that ￿2(t) < ￿￿




















This is to say that before an appropriate development stage is reached, any
attempt to shut down the imitative sector in favour of the innovative one will
result to be growth diminishing for the follower.
Crucially, again, this result depends on the human capital composition in
the South.27 It is worth to notice here how not only the enforcement of property
rights but also the relative gap in the endowment of high skilled workers between
the North and the South and the relative gap in institutional quality a⁄ect the
decision of whether imitation is chosen over innovation by the South.
Proposition 4 Improvements in the economic fundamentals of the South (hu-
man capital and institutional quality) make imitation increasingly less attractive
w.r.t. innovation. However, the e⁄ect of an increase in the ratio of high skilled
workers on the decision on whether to perform imitation or innovation (and ul-
timately on economic performance) depends upon the South development stage.
27This can be explained by the fact that both imitation and innovation are better performed
(they come at a lower cost) when the fraction of high skilled workers is higher. This is in the
spirit of the Nelson and Phelps (1966) hypothesis. This said, however, Lr2 enters into eq.(39)
a⁄ecting v2 less than proportionally while a⁄ecting ￿2 linearly. Ceteris paribus an increase
in the share of high skilled workers employed will a⁄ect the ratio in eq.(39) by increasing the
denominator and making innovation increasingly more pro￿table w.r.t. imitation.
22Institutional quality di⁄erences between the North and the South, as ex-
pected, play a role in the de￿nition of the conditions for which imitation rather
than innovation results to be optimal in the long run. In particular we ￿nd how
an increase in the quality of institutions in the South reduces the pro￿tability
of imitation w.r.t innovation with the inequality in eq.(33) being less likely to
hold for high values of A2.
From a more general point of view even if it is di¢ cult to determine the
causality between institutional improvements and economic development28, it is
clear how the two phenomena evolve on parallel paths and usually coexists. As a
country develops from an economic point of view it is more likely to start obeying
international rules as well as to pursue a better control of diversion within its
boundaries. Our result show how, consistently with these assumptions, as a
country improves on its institutional quality it is also more likely to shift from
imitation to innovation activities in the long run and how this choice results to
be an optimal one.29
On the other hand, an increase in the share of the high skilled workforce in
the South implies a reduction of the costs of imitation (as shown in eq. (22))
but also a reduction of the cost of producing potential innovation (as shown
in eq.(8)). Hence, an increase in the high skilled share of the total workforce
results to be generally growth enhancing. However, the positive impact of an
increase of skilled workers over imitation and innovation activities is uneven.
While an increase of Lr2 implies a proportional decrease in the cost of producing
innovation, its impact on the imitation cost depends on the actual proximity to
the technological frontier, N2=N1 , that is on the follower￿ s development stage
as shown in eq.(22).
Ceteris paribus, increasing the high skilled content of the follower￿ s workforce
leads to a decrease of both ￿ and ￿. This implies, on the other hand, that the
inequality in eq. (33) is gradually less likely to hold for any given value of
IPRs enforcement in the South when the fraction of workforce with high skills
increases. To put it in other words, imitation becomes less attractive in the long
run when the economic fundamentals of the follower improve, namely when the
share of high skilled human capital in the South increases. Here below we
analyze the composition growth e⁄ect of an increase in human capital.
Proposition 5 A rise in the fraction of population with a higher level of educa-
tion is growth enhancing under broad conditions. Conversely, a rise in the frac-
tion of population with a lower degree of education is growth diminishing. The
result applies in imitation or innovation for both North and South economies.
28See Hall and Jones (1999) for an example of this analysis.
29As in Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), it is here evident how some "poor in-
stitutional arrangements" (imitation and lax IPRs) may optimally arise at initial stages of
development of a country but that these will be abandoned as a country catches up with the
frontier.
23This result can be seen by the inspection of the growth rate in eq. (20)
for the leader or from its correspondent in eq.(25) for the follower. Everything
else equal, the growth rate of the economy is a function of the level of educated
(skilled) over uneducated (unskilled) workers in the economy. Taking the partial
derivative of the growth rate w.r.t. Lri and imposing this to be greater than









[1 ￿ 2Lri] (40)
Due to the assumptions made on the model parameters in order to ensure







be always greater than zero. This leads to the following:
@￿i
@Lri
> 0 , Lri < 1=2 (41)
The derivative in eq.(40) shows how an increase in the skilled fraction of
workforce is growth enhancing for plausible values of Lri, that is for values of
Lri below the half of the total population. Instead, the opposite is true for the
unskilled population. That is, when Ly1 is below 1/2 an increase in the fraction
of population with a higher degree (which decreases the fraction of those with
a lower one) will be growth bene￿cial.30
Proposition 6 Once the steady state technology proximity with the leader has
been reached, a tightening of IPRs above the threshold level ~ ￿ is condition neces-
sary but not su¢ cient to achieve absolute convergence and higher income levels.
"Appropriate" human capital levels, skills and institutions are needed for the
follower in order to perform innovation pro￿tably and to catch up with the fron-
tier. In any other case a tightening of IPRs (when institutional and human
capital quality remain poor) leads to suboptimal equilibria and to conditional
convergence.
From the analysis of the propositions above we know that when imitation is
performed the optimal IPRs regime is ~ ￿. Southern growth is maximized by the
particular path that satis￿es ￿ = ~ ￿ up to the point where N2=N1 = ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿.
We showed how within the transitional dynamics imitation rather than in-
novation proves to be more pro￿table. This result holds also when the costs
of imitation rise moderately31 due to a slight increase in the strength of IPRs.
Higher returns are paid to imitation (w.r.t innovation) before the steady state
technology, ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿, has been reached.
30In both cases the relation between the increase in the share of high skilled human capital
and the growth rate of the economy is not linear and it encounters diminishing returns pointing
to possible duplication e⁄ects as argued by Romer (1990).
31As shown in proposition 2.
24This said, the crucial question is whether ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ < 1 represents the best
outcome that the follower can achieve in the long run once we assume also that
innovation is possible for the follower. We analyze this case here below.
First of all, it is straightforward to show how, for any value of the techno-




















Above the steady state value ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ the South grows faster performing
innovation than it does performing imitation due to the small residual tech-
nology gap w.r.t. the frontier which was before the reason of its growth com-
parative advantage. Hence, as a ￿rst general remark, a higher proximity w.r.t.
the technological frontier could be theoretically achieved only by switching to
innovation once ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ has been reached: Innovation, in fact, is performed
more e¢ ciently than imitation at relatively high development stages when the
follower is close to the technological frontier and the number of blueprints to be
imitated scarce.
Crucially, therefore, if the South starts innovating above ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ it be-
comes immediately optimal to fully enforce IPRs within its boundaries such
that R&D will receive the maximum incentive and the new blueprints discov-
ered in the South will be fully ensured against imitation.
At the same time, we showed in previous propositions that if the South
starts innovating below ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿ its welfare will decrease. In fact, ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿
may be thought as a growth turning point which must be reached by performing
imitation but overtaken by innovation.
Hence, the new steady state value for technology proximity of the South
w.r.t. the North (when the South performs innovation) will be now given by
the following:
￿










^ N2= ^ N1
￿￿
> ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿
25Crucially, the South still represents the technological follower due to the fact
that the
￿
^ N2= ^ N1
￿￿
< 1.
Let us express the attainable income ratio between South and North in the
long run by combining eq.(15) and its correspondent for the South with eq.(43).







^ N2= ^ N1
￿￿i
(44)
The income ratio between the two economies in eq.(44) will not remain
constant due to the relative di⁄erences between the economic fundamentals of
the South w.r.t. those of the North. The North, in fact, is still more e¢ cient in
producing innovation.
Hence, fully enforcing IPRs is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition to
achieve absolute convergence with the leader. In fact, as expected, unless the
South improves on its economic fundamentals (skills, human capital of institu-
tions) it will be "trapped" in a high development stage, between the attainable ￿
^ N2= ^ N1
￿￿
and the lower ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿.32
This scenario captures the situation of those countries at the frontier which
are technologically developed but still fail in reaching the same income standards
of the leaders due to small but persistent di⁄erences in R&D or institutional
quality w.r.t. the leader country. Convergence in technological levels is therefore
conditional in the sense that it depends on the economic fundamentals of the
two economies.33
Absolute convergence may be achieved, therefore, only by rising the high
skilled fraction of total workforce and the overall institutional quality of the
economy. In fact, from eq.(8), eq.(35) and the correspondent for economy 2 of
eq.(40) it may be seen how an increase in Lr2 will imply a decrease in ￿, the
ratio ￿2=￿1 which represents the inverse of the e¢ ciency of the R&D sectors in
the two economies. In a similar way, also an increase of institutional quality
of the South ends up leading to an increase in the ratio (Y2=Y1)
￿ by rising the
parameter ￿:
32In other words, due to the di⁄erences in economic fundamentals between North and South
it will be true that, above ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿; also (￿inn:
2 > ￿imit
2 ) < ￿1. Hence, even if slower, the
South will diverge from the North and go back to ( ~ N2= ~ N1)￿:
33If institutional quality or human capital levels do not contextually improve as the follower
moves from imitation to innovation by tightening its IPRs regime it is simple to show how
the growth of the follower will be reduced both if this innovates or imitates. In the ￿rst case,
innovation will be poorly performed (making use of a relatively less skilled workforce w.r.t.
the leader). The number of new blueprint discovered by the South will be less than that
discovered in the North implying an increasing technological gap North-South. In the second
case, imitation also will be performed ine¢ ciently due to the higher costs imposed by the
fully enforced IPRs regime w.r.t. the situation where ￿ = ~ ￿ that is when the IPRs regime is
optimal in imitation.
26Leapfrogging of the South w.r.t. the North is also possible when the North
becomes intrinsically inferior w.r.t. the South in its economic fundamentals,
institutional quality and human capital as standard neoclassical theory would
suggest. When the analysis is the same but reversed with the North being the
follower.
7 Conclusions
The debate over the enforcement of IPRs in developing countries has still not
led to an agreement. In particular, the e⁄ects of the TRIPs agreement which
forces LDCs to adopt the IPRs regime of developed countries is object of lively
discussion.
One major line of disagreement over the adoption of stronger IPRs in de-
veloping countries is that they may harm LDCs￿growth by prohibitively rising
the costs of imitation. One of the arguments used by developed countries in
favour of strong IPRs protection standards in developing countries is based on
the fact that these are expected to promote own based research and innovation
(discouraging imitation). Even if this may be actually the case, it is not clear
whether shifting resources from imitation to innovation ex abrupto may be re-
garded as an optimal policy regardless of the development stage of the economy
under consideration. The usual concern about the implementation of strong
IPRs regimes relates to the fact that follower countries, endowed with low levels
of institutions and human capital, may not be able to compete with the leaders
in product innovation when IPRs are strongly enforced and imitation is reduced
drastically.34
A trade-o⁄ exists in the enforcement of IPRs in developing countries which
do not apply to developed ones. Imitation, on one hand, represents probably
the major technological activity for least developed countries. This is so due to
the relative lower costs of imitation w.r.t. those of innovation. On the other
hand, stronger IPRs regimes, it is argued, may set the right economic incen-
tives conductive to higher growth in the long run through own based R&D and
technology development. Hence, the decision of whether enforcing IPRs in de-
veloping countries, and of how much, should be based on these cost calculations.
With this paper we show how, inserting di⁄erences in IPRs enforcement and
in the composition of human capital stocks into a standard innovation-imitation
34It has been argued by several commentators how the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which concluded the Uruguay Round of negotiations
at the WTO in 1994, basically set uniform intellectual property protection standards (which
are those of the developed nations) on all members without leaving any ￿exibility to developing
nations if not in the date of full enforcement of the treaty itself. The date for full adoption and
implementation of TRIPS by LDCs, the 1st of January 2006, has recently passed but Least
Developed Countries may apply for an extention with regards to pharmaceutical products
only to the year 2016.
27growth model leads to interesting policy making insights. One of the novelties
of our contribution stands in the joint analysis of IPRs, of human capital and
institutional di⁄erences along with that of the role played by each economy￿ s
development stage.
We are able to depict how much the South can increase its IPRs regime
before harming its own growth. This depends heavily on the joint behaviors
of the other variables in the model, that is, on the relative quality of human
capital and general institutions in the South.
Our results show how the switch to innovation cannot be made regardless of
the economic fundamentals and development stage of the follower. If the switch
from imitation to innovation happens to early in the development of the follower
it will result to be growth diminishing. The follower will not be able to produce
innovation pro￿tably before a certain development is reached. This also requires
a consistent increase in the human capital endowment of the follower and an
improvement of its institutional quality.
We then ￿nd an optimal IPRs regime such that growth is maximized in the
long run when imitation is performed by the South. Di⁄erently from previous
theoretical literature, a moderate increase in the IPRs enforcement (when we
start below the optimal IPRs regime) results to be growth enhancing for the
follower even if this performs only imitation at initial stages of development.
This is due to the fact that imitation, as argued by Levin et al. (1987), Mans-
￿eld, Schwartz, and Wagner (1981) or Gallini (1992) is a costly activity and, as
innovation, needs some degree of monopoly power in order for the associated
￿xed cost to be recouped by the imitator as well.
We studied these issues by building a North-South theoretical model where
innovation and imitation are performed. Here, the leader country, representing
the North, produces innovation at the frontier more e¢ ciently than the South
due to its more skilled workforce. The South, however, may transitively grow
faster than the North by imitating the technologies discovered at the frontier
due to imperfect IPRs protection. Imitation results to be cheaper at initial
stages of development.
We merged features from di⁄erent previous contributions such as Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1997), Helpman (1993) or Grossman and Helpman (1991), Nelson
and Phelps (1966) and Behnabib and Spiegel (2005) in order to formalize the
cost function and dynamics of the follower country.
The relative easiness of imitation, its cost, has been assumed to be a function
of the proximity to the technological frontier, of the IPRs regime and of the
quality of human capital devoted to imitation in the South. All these variables
have been shown to be crucial in the de￿nition of the optimal growth path for
the follower country. Similarly to Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006)
28or Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006) we ￿nd how some poor institutional
arrangements arise at initial stages of development and that these are growth
maximizing until a threshold development stage is reached. In particular the
South ￿nds optimal to keep its IPRs regime low enough in order to maximize
its growth until a critical development stage is reached.
The predictions of our model therefore are consistent with the idea that "one
size (XL) IPRs may not ￿t all". This is to say that a complete harmonization
of IPRs regimes may be growth detrimental when it does not take into account
the speci￿c economic and institutional development of the follower countries,
that is their human capital and institutional levels. In this sense IPRs regimes
can be considered "appropriate" to the development stage of an economy.
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